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The minority model was introduced to study the competition between agents with limited infor-
mation. It has the remarkable feature that, as the amount of information available increases, the
collective gain made by the agents is reduced. This crowd effect arises from the fact that only
a minority can profit at each moment, while all agents make their choices using the same input.
We show that the properties of the model change drastically if the agents make choices based on
their individual stories, keeping all remaining rules unaltered. This variation reduces the intrinsic
frustration of the model, and improves the tendency towards cooperation and self organization. We
finally study the stable mixing of individual and collective behavior.
PACS numbers:02.50.-r, 02.50.Ga, 05.40.+j
The minority game [1] was first introduced in the anal-
ysis of decision making by agents with bounded rational-
ity, based on the “El Farol” bar problem [2]. A number
of agents must make a choice between two alternatives.
The choice proves beneficial to a given agent if the total
number of agents making that choice is below a given
threshold. The game was formulated in a precise way by
D. Challet and Y.-C. Zhang [1]. The bounded rational-
ity of the agents is modeled by assuming that each agent
can only process information about the outcomes in the
m previous time steps. Given the 2m possible states an
agent could afford, there are 22
m
strategies. Each agent
has s strategies, taken at random from the total pool,
and for making next decision selects the best performing
one of her own set. The choice is successful if the agent is
in the minority group, which means that the “comfort”
threshold is set at 50% the total number of agents. Fi-
nally, the agents assign a score to each strategies at their
disposal. The score of the strategies which, at a given
time, have predicted the correct outcome is increased by
one point.
The game has by now been extensively studied. Par-
ticular emphasis has been devoted to the mean square
deviation of the number of agents making a given choice,
σ, which measures the efficiency of the system. When the
fluctuations are large (larger σ), the number of agents in
the majority side (the number of losers) increases. In
this way, the variance measures the degree of coopera-
tion, or mutual benefit of the agents. It has been shown
that it scales with ρ ≡ 2m/N [1, 3–5], where N is the
number of agents and 2m is the number of different con-
figurations that the agents are capable of processing (or
states of the world, see [6]). When ρ≫ 1, the amount of
information available to the agents is so large that they
cannot manage and exploit it, and agents take decisions
like coin tossing, so that in this limit σ2/N → 1/4. In
the opposite limit, ρ ≪ 1, the set of strategies of dif-
ferent agents overlap significantly. The agents tend to
make similar choices, which puts them often in the ma-
jority group. Then σ2 scales with N2, instead of N .
This regime is highly inefficient from the point of view of
the whole population. The agents manage, however, to
arbitrage away all information in the collective history.
The value of σ has a minimum for intermediate values
of ρ which can be appreciated for not too large values
of s. At this minimum, the agents perform better than
random, and some degree of cooperation is established.
This minimum can be understood as a critical point in
an effective spin model with frustrated interactions and
an applied field [6].
A crucial ingredient in the model is the fact that all
agents act on the same information, irrespective of how
it has been generated. Similar results are obtained when
the histories are replaced by successions of random num-
bers [7], which allows for interesting analytical analy-
ses [6, 8]. Evolutionary variations, in which agents with
different number of strategies, s, capabilities to analyze
the time series (as given by m), or additional adjustable
parameters have also been studied [3, 9]. The ρ ≪ 1
regime leads not only to large values of σ but also to com-
plex distribution probabilities with a rich structure [10].
The model has been used to describe the interactions
of agents competing for scarce resources in different con-
texts [3,5]. However, it is unlikely that the rules by which
the agents make their choices define a evolutionary stable
strategy, in the sense commonly used in theoretical biol-
ogy [11]. The low global gain in the limit ρ ≪ 1 implies
that alternative rules can easily improve the performance
of the agents. This hypothesis has been verified in dif-
ferent variations of the minority game as defined above.
Competition between agents with different memories was
first analyzed in [3]. The rules were extended using an ad-
ditional parameter to improve the chance that the agents
use anticorrelated strategies. The value of this parame-
ter was set using an evolution scheme which favors the
agent’s performance [12]. It has been shown that two
populations of agents with different memories, m, per-
form better than pure populations taken separately [13].
Renewal of the strategies available to the agents also
leads to improvements in the performance [14]. In a dif-
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ferent context, the global gain made by the agents can
increase by adding randomness to the decision making
process [8].
We analyze the simplest extension of the model which
preserves the basic structure of the agents’ decision pro-
cess. Each agent has the same number of strategies, s,
defined in the usual way, which process information from
the m preceding time intervals. Unlike in the usual def-
inition of the game, the agents do not analyze the suc-
cessions of best choices from the collective point of view,
but respond to the story of the individual choices made
by each of them. Each agent updates the scores of the
strategies according to which strategy, when applied to
the individual succession of choices made by that agent,
leads to a successful outcome. This is the only difference
from the usual case. The processing power of the agents
is exactly the same. The model provides a simple way in
which agents can avoid a frustrating situation by ignor-
ing or distorting the information that has lead them to
it.
We compare the values of the mean square deviations
of the attendances, σ, in the present version of the mi-
nority game and the canonical results in fig. 1.
In the limit when the information available to the
agents is too large, we find that σ2 → N/4, the same
result as if the agents made their choices at random, just
in the case of high values of s. For case s = 3 shown
in the figure σ2 → N/5, and this value is even lower for
s = 2. s = 1 is, as in the standard game, highly sen-
sible to the initial conditions, and averaging over them,
gives a dispersion equal to N/4 independently of ρ. In
the limit ρ → 0, the values of σ are significantly lower
in the “individual” version of the game presented here,
and comparable, or lower, than those found in other ex-
tensions of the model. There is a significant spreading
as function of m and N , meaning that the scaling with
ρ is not too well satisfied. The scaling with ρ implic-
itly assumes that all possible histories appear with the
same probability in the collective history [4, 6, 7]. In the
present version of the model, if the individual stories used
by the agents are replaced by random series, σ takes val-
ues close to the random case, irrespective of the value of
ρ. Thus, the main hypothesis used to justify the scaling
in the minority game in its usual form does not hold in
this case.
The group which was on the winning side can be be
inferred from the “comfort” that the agent gained after
each outcome. This information is used in updating the
score of the strategies, which, however, act on a different
input. As this input is not the same for all agents, they
have no obstacle in following anticorrelated dynamics,
even when all use similar strategies. The measure of that
correlation can be analyzed explicitly by taking the aver-
age Hamming distance between agents histories [15]. We
have further analyzed this point by calculating the av-
erage number of histories processed by the agents. The
number of histories is always significantly below that in
the canonical model (P = 2m), implying that the system
tends to be locked into situations where agents generate
a relatively small number of possibly anticorrelated indi-
vidual histories. This P , is also a function of m, N , and
s, in such a way that it decreases monotonically when in-
creasing N and decreasing m. When s is small the limit
for largem and small N , is not 2m, but some lower value.
This would explain the limit of σ2/N 6= 1/4 when ρ is
large discussed above.
The present version of the model needs not to define
a evolutionary stable strategy. If there is information
available in the series of global minority groups, an agent
playing according to the canonical rules will benefit from
doing so. We have analyzed the competition between
these two types of behavior by allowing each agent to
have a dual scoring system for its strategies, following the
two set of rules. Each agent plays the strategy with the
highest score at a given time step. Thus, the population
can be divided into those using collective rules and those
using individual rules. The values of σ obtained in this
way, and the fraction of agents using a collective strategy
are shown in fig. 2.
In the limit when the information available is large,
ρ → ∞, we recover the random value for σ. Then, both
behaviors are indifferent, and the agents use 50% of the
time each of them. The fraction of agents which use
a collective behavior has a maximum near the value of
ρ for which σ has a minimum in the usual version of
the model. Finally, the number of agents using collec-
tive rules strongly decreases as ρ → 0. In this limit, the
preferable behavior is the individual one outlined here,
although a small fraction of agents using a collective ap-
proach survives. The global efficiency, however, is de-
creased. Thus, although a mixed population is the stable
situation, the small fraction of agents which follow collec-
tive rules behave in a parasitic way, lowering the overall
gain.
The most striking difference with the usual version of
the minority game takes place when only one strategy
is available to each agent, s = 1. This case is trivial in
the minority game, as the agents have no way to learn or
to adapt. The same applies if each agent uses a purely
individual set of rules. When the agents can use the
best of the two behaviors, the strategy of each agent can
be used to process two inputs: the collective history of
winning sides, or the succession of prior choices made by
that agent. This is shown in fig. 3.
The global performance of an hybrid set of agents using
both collective and individual rules is best when s = 1 for
a large range of values of ρ. A qualitative explanation of
the adaptability of the agents in this extreme limit can be
obtained by noting that, when a given agent repeatedly
makes an incorrect choice, its individual history is an-
ticorrelated with the sequence of collective best choices.
Thus, if the strategy at its disposal gives a different out-
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come when presented with the two inputs, the agent will
tend to give the opposite answer to that used, unsuccess-
fully, before. There is a self correcting mechanism built
into the model, which tends to prevent very negative per-
formances. On the other hand, if the agents are locked in
into a situation where each of them obtains about 50%
of the points, a stable situation can be achieved, where
the agents remain anticorrelated by alternating between
the two inputs at the disposal of each of them. This is
consistent with the result that the fraction of agents us-
ing collective and individual behavior is comparable for
all values of ρ.
In conclusion, we have discussed the simplest extension
of the minority game which preserves the basic parame-
ters of the model. We show that agents with the same
processing power as in the usual model can perform much
better if they use their individual histories as input, in-
stead of the evolution of the global system. An evolu-
tionary stable situation arises with agents which can use
both collective and individual rules. The capability of the
agents to adapt and increase the global performance is
significantly enhanced, and herd effects disappear. These
emergent features change qualitatively even the simplest
and most trivial version of the minority game, that in
which each agent disposes of a single strategy.
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FIG. 1. σ2/N vs 2m/N in the collective (three upper
graphs) and individual (three lower ones) games. Each point
represents the average of 5 independent runs for different
values of N , and m=4 (△), m=5 (N), m=6 (◦), m=7 (•),
m=8 (✷), and m=9 (). For clarity each value of s is repre-
sented in a separate graph.
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FIG. 2. Mean square deviation of the attendances in a
model where agents use collective and individual rules (left
axis), and fraction of agents which use an individual rule
(right axis). Different symbols correspond to different choices
of m (see fig. 1).
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FIG. 3. The same magnitudes drawn in 2, but for the case
s = 1. Also different symbols correspond to different choices
of m (see fig. 1).
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